Doomed diplomacy can't justify surrendering commitments: A Critique
Pater ipse colendi haud facilem esse viam voluit
Original Post
Let us begin this critique by considering some questions: What would it take to change one’s perspective on the war in Ukraine? New facts with supporting evidence, presumably. But whose facts, and what’s the standard of evidence? Why, the only facts of interest pertain, in one way or another, to the war in Ukraine, and the standard of evidence is, if we’re serious about inching nearer to Truth (= a complete conception of the whole), the same as in any science worthy of the name, that is, we evaluate the extent to which the facts under consideration correspond to the Real (= our shared empirical reality, where things like war and diplomacy happen).
Whoa, slow down there cowboy! What pretense is this? We live in a post-truth age, do we not? These quaint ideas are not just out of fashion, they’ve been all but forgotten, except perhaps by some Hegelians and other religious people, if such relics still exist.
Oh, but we do exist, we do! Yes, indeed, there are many of us who have not squandered all of our intellectual faculties on fashionable nonsense, old or new. There dwell among us still, many who, following Burke:
“…have not (as I conceive) lost the generosity and dignity of thinking of the fourteenth century, nor as yet have we subtilized ourselves into savages. We are not the converts of Rousseau; we are not the disciples of Voltaire; Helvetius has made no progress amongst us. Atheists are not our preachers; madmen are not our lawgivers. We know that we have made no discoveries, and we think that no discoveries are to be made in morality, nor many in the great principles of government, nor in the ideas of liberty, which were understood long before we were born, altogether as well as they will be after the grace has heaped its mold upon our presumption and the silent tomb shall have imposed its law on our pert loquacity. …we have not yet been completely embowelled of our natural entrails; we still feel within us, and we cherish and cultivate, those inbred sentiments which are the faithful guardians, the active monitors of our duty, the true supporters of all liberal and manly morals. We have not been drawn and trussed, in order that we may be filled, like stuffed birds in a museum, with chaff and rags and paltry blurred shreds of paper about the rights of men. We preserve the whole of our feelings still native and entire, unsophisticated by pedantry and infidelity. We have real hearts of flesh and blood beating in our bosoms. We fear God; we look up with awe to kings, with affection to parliaments, with duty to magistrates, with reverence to priests, and with respect to nobility. Why? Because when such ideas are brought before our minds, it is natural to be so affected; because all other feelings are false and spurious and tend to corrupt our minds, to vitiate our primary morals, to render us unfit for rational liberty, and, by teaching us a servile, licentious, and abandoned insolence, to be our low sport for a few holidays, to make us perfectly fit for, and justly deserving of, slavery through the whole course of our lives.
You see, Sir, that in this enlightened age I am bold enough to confess that we are generally men of untaught feelings, that, instead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted and the more generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid to put men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason, because we suspect that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages. Many of our men of speculation, instead of exploding general prejudices, employ their sagacity to discover the latent wisdom which prevails in them. If they find what they seek, and they seldom fail, they think it more wise to continue the prejudice, with the reason involved, than to cast away the coat of prejudice and to leave nothing but the naked reason; because prejudice, with its reason, has a motive to give action to that reason, and an affection which will give it permanence. Prejudice is of ready application in the emergency; it previously engages the mind in a steady course of wisdom and virtue and does not leave the man hesitating in the moment of decision skeptical, puzzled, and unresolved. Prejudice renders a man’s virtue his habit, and not a series of unconnected acts. Through just prejudice, his duty becomes a part of his nature." (pp. 72-73)
Perhaps we will have occasion to consider more from Burke later. For now, comfortable in our prejudices, we must hasten to observe that by taking postmodern skeptical relativism seriously (or, at least, pretending to), our position at once becomes unintelligible. We would be like a freemason trying to demolish his cathedral with its foundation stones. Having no basis for criticism of any kind, it would seem there’s not much left for us to do except embrace the sensualism of Epicurus. Or is there? (p. 684) But we digress.
We must, therefore, in advancing our critique, operate under the assumption that facts and evidence still count for something. Exactly what remains to be seen. We therefore return to our questions and ask again: whose facts, and what is the standard of evidence? Again, we answer, this time more precisely, that we are interested only in relevant facts supported by empirical evidence. As a corollary, once relevant facts are established as facts in light of supporting evidence, the sources of these facts, if they were ever a matter of suspicion, are immediately now of secondary, if any, importance.
And yet, how likely is it that this analytical procedure will be followed? And suppose it is followed, what sort of results would we expect? Consider the following scenarios:
“A convinced believer in the anti-Semitic ideology tells me that the Bolshevik revolution is a Jewish plot. I point out to him that the revolution was led to its first major victory by a non-Jew, Lenin. He then explains that Lenin was the pawn of Trotsky, Radek, Bukharin, Zinoviev and other Jews who were in the Bolshevik High Command. I remind him that Lenin's successor as leader of the revolution, the non-Jew Stalin, killed off all those Jews; and that Stalin has been followed by the non-Jew Khrushchev, under whose rule there have been notable revivals of anti-Semitic attitudes and conduct. He then informs me that the seeming Soviet anti-Semitism is only a fraud invented by the Jewish press, and that Stalin and Khrushchev are really Jews whose names have been changed, with a total substitution of forged records. Suppose I am able to present documents that even he will have to admit show this to be impossible. He is still unmoved. He tells me that the real Jewish center that controls the revolution and the entire world conspiracy is not in Russia anyway, but in Antwerp, Tel Aviv, Lhasa, New York or somewhere, and that it has deliberately eliminated the Jews from the public officialdom of the Bolshevik countries in order to conceal its hand and deceive the world about what is going on. Q.E.D.
A believer in dialectical materialism—the communist ideology—states that the Communist Party represents the interests of the proletariat, that is, of the workers. I show that in this, that and the other country, most of the workers do not support the Communist Party, even where a democratic political order would permit them to do so without hindrance. He explains that the opinions of the workers have been corrupted by capitalist social conditions and pro-capitalist indoctrination. I note, with adequate documentation, that in countries run by the Communist Party the workers are worse off and have still less influence on the government than in many non-communist countries. He tells me that this reflects the survival of capitalist remnants, the backwardness of the economy taken over from capitalism and the hostile pressure of the surrounding imperialist environment; and that, in any case, what the Communist Party represents is not the "present consciousness" of the workers, blinded by ignorance and illusion, but their "objective historical interest." Q.E.D.
A liberal informs me that the races of mankind do not differ in intellectual or moral capacity, in "civilization-building" talent, or in any other attribute fitting them to exercise full and equal political rights. I mention that most scholars in the field, whatever their philosophical views, seem to agree that at any rate the Australian bushmen and African pigmies are somewhat defective in these respects, however admirable in others. These two instances he dismisses as no more than living fossils, evolutionary accidents that have no practical significance. I recall studies proving that the various races show considerable differences, not traceable to social environment, in susceptibility to certain diseases, in physiological reactions and physical measurements, etc. He answers (even when, as is not seldom the case, his theoretical philosophy commits him to a view that denies the independent reality of "mind") that these physical differences have no bearing on the question of mental differences. I point out to him that Negroes in the United States have not attained levels of intellectual eminence in as high a proportion to their numbers as have whites. He explains that this is obviously due to their lack of equal education. I restrict the comparison to the members of the two races who have received the same amount of schooling. He says the schooling provided for Negroes is inferior in facilities and quality to that provided for whites, even when equal in amount. I accept the further restriction, and still note a disparity in attainments. He then explains that there cannot be equality in racially separate schools no matter if they are equal in all other respects, because the separateness itself causes traumatic disturbances that have a negative effect on the educative process. I offer the comparative records of graduates of schools in which the two races sit together. He assimilates these by pointing to the less favorable economic, social and cultural condition of the Negro sample outside of school. I ask about the results of tests that have been alleged to rate intellectual abilities independently of environment and education. When these are found to rate Negroes at levels substantially below whites of the same age, he concludes that the tests do not really do what is claimed, that they have been devised in a white-controlled culture and reflect not innate but in part acquired traits unconsciously introduced. And so on. Q.E.D.
The militant segregationist will have equivalent answers, in reverse, to all possible queries. I mention, after hearing him assert the innate inferiority of the Negro race, the fact that in baseball, boxing, track and field sports, Negroes are the champions. These purely physical achievements, he explains, are proof how close Negroes remain to animals in the evolutionary scale. I add the names of Negro musicians, singers, actors and writers of the first rank. Naturally, he comments, they carry over a sense of rhythm from the tribal dance and tom-tom ceremonies. I ask how many law graduates of his State university could stand up against Judge Thurgood Marshall; how many sociologists, against Professor C. Eric Lincoln; how many psychologists, against Professor Kenneth Clark [today, we might add the economists Thomas Sowell, Walter Williams, and Glenn Loury]? Doubtless all such have plenty of white blood, he answers, but in any case they are only exceptions to prove the general rule of inferiority; that is confirmed by the low intellectual attainments of the average Negro. I observe that the average Negro has been educated in worse schools, and for fewer years, than the average white. Of course, he agrees: no use wasting good education on low-grade material. . . . Q.E.D.
[Footnote: My interest in this section is solely in the method of reasoning, and has nothing to do with the merits of the positions defended or questioned in these hypothetical instances: anti-Semitism, communism, the belief in the innate equality of races, and the other instances that will follow.] ( Burnham, pp. 100-103)
Our purpose in quoting these scenarios is to investigate the likelihood of this analytical procedure—this “method of reasoning”—bearing fruit. What would bearing fruit look like? Why, bearing fruit would look like transcending this impasse. And what is at the root of this impasse? Evidently nothing other than strict adherence to a political ideology. And what, finally, is a political ideology?
Here we turn to Michael Oakeshott:
“As I understand it, a political ideology purports to be an abstract principle, or set of related abstract principles, which has been independently premeditated. It supplies in advance of the activity of attending to the arrangements of a society a formulated end to be pursued, and in so doing it provides a means of distinguishing between those desires which ought to be encouraged and those which ought to be suppressed or redirected.
The simplest sort of political ideology is a single abstract idea, such as Freedom, Equality, Maximum Productivity, Racial Purity, or Happiness. And in that case political activity is understood as the enterprise of seeing that the arrangements of a society conform to or reflect the chosen abstract idea. It is usual, however, to recognize the need for a complex scheme of related ideas, rather than a single idea, [as in] such systems of ideas as: "the principles of 1789," "Liberalism," "Democracy," "Marxism," or the Atlantic Charter. These principles need not be considered absolute or immune from change (though they are frequently so considered), but their value lies in their having been premeditated. ... A political ideology purports to supply in advance knowledge of what "Freedom" or "Democracy" or "Justice" is.” (p. 116)
Now, we can’t help but wonder: what would strict adherence to political ideology look like in the case of the current conflict in Ukraine? Perhaps something like this: The postmodern liberal is incensed at the unprovoked aggression of fascist-led Russia against our long-time democratic allies in Ukraine and demands immediate actions be taken that are consistent with our treaty-bound obligations. All options, up to and including war, must be open to consideration. A bystander in a MAGA hat points out that the territories invaded and occupied by Russia are, in the majority, ethnically Russian and support the annexation. He adds that these territories have in fact been the front-lines of a years-long campaign of aggression against the ethnically Russian civilian inhabitants of these regions by the Ukrainian neo-Nazi Azov Regiment, and so Russia’s actions are not unprovoked. The postmodern liberal dismisses all of this as Russian disinformation. He cites several prominent “fact checkers” and a document signed by fifty-one esteemed members of our intelligence community attesting to the same. The bystander points out that our intelligence agencies, like all agencies, are vulnerable to elite capture (p. 205) and contends that the elite members of these and similar government agencies, the media, and corporate boardrooms have been captured, either through overt ideological commitment or through covert blackmail, or in some cases both, and are therefore compromised. He rambles on about Operation Mockingbird, Soviet defector Yuri Bezmenov’s books and films, as well as the speech of Chinese General Chi Haotian and the book Unrestricted Warfare, as evidence of the plot. He insists the work of Julian Assange and Edward Snowden corroborate the corruption. Finally, he cites the media coverup of Hunter Biden’s laptop, which exposes the Biden family’s financial connections to China and Ukraine, among other crimes, and adds that the recent bankruptcy of FTX is tied to money laundering and other nefarious activities in Ukraine, such as bio weapons research. The postmodern liberal now takes a step back, having become wary of the bystander, who suddenly seems like one of those dangerous Qanon conspiracy theorists, and walks away. Q.E.D.
What has our little exercise revealed? It seems we’re no better off than when we started, but perhaps no worse for the wear, either. At this point we must resume our investigation and ask: can this analytical procedure bear the kind of fruit we were looking for, namely, the fruit of transcendence? It appears that, so long as we are bound by the dogmas of ideology, the answer is no. But is it possible to transcend ideology completely? Burnham thinks we can, and argues as much in chapter VII.
Now, suppose, for the sake of argument, that “the alternative to an ideology is not solely other ideologies”; suppose, instead, there is “also the possibility of abandoning ideologies and ideological thinking altogether.” (p. 131) What would that look like? Let the following set of propositions serve as a rough sketch:
Human nature exhibits constant as well as changing attributes. It is at least partially defective or corrupt intrinsically, and thus limited in its potential for progressive development; in particular, incapable of realizing the good society of peace, justice, freedom and well- being.
Human beings are moved by sentiment, passion, intuition and other non-rational impulses at least as much as by reason. Any view of man, history and society that neglects the non-rational impulses and their embodiment in custom, prejudice, tradition and authority, or that conceives of a social order in which the non-rational impulses and their embodiments are wholly subject to abstract reason, is an illusion.
Besides ignorance and faulty social institutions there are many other obstacles to progress and the achievement of the good society: some rooted in the biological, psychological, moral and spiritual nature of man; some, in the difficulties of the terrestrial environment; others, in the intransigence of nature; still others, derived from man's loneliness in the material universe.
Since there are intrinsic and permanent as well as extrinsic and remediable obstacles, the good society of universal peace, justice, freedom and well-being cannot be achieved, and there are no solutions to most of the primary social problems—which are, in truth, not so much "problems" as permanent conditions of human existence. Plans based on the goal of realizing the ideal society or solving the primary problems are likely to be dangerous as well as Utopian, and to lessen rather than increase the probability of bringing about the moderate improvement and partial solutions that are in reality possible.
Although traditional institutions, beliefs and modes of conduct can get so out of line with real conditions as to become intolerable handicaps to human well-being, there is a certain presumption in their favor as part of the essential fabric of society; a strong presumption against changing them both much and quickly.
There is no indication from experience that universal education based on reason and science—even if it were possible, which it is not—can actually eliminate or even much reduce the kinds of ignorance that bear on individual and social conduct.
There is no indication from experience that all bad institutions can be got rid of by democratic or any other kind of reforms; if some bad institutions are eliminated, some of the institutions remaining, or some that replace them, will be bad or will become bad.
There are biological, psychological and moral as well as social causes of the major evils of society. A program of social reform combined with a merely permissive, educational and reformist approach to those who embody the evils not only has no prospect of curing the evils—which is in any event impossible—but in practice often fosters rather than mitigates them, and fails to protect the healthier sectors of society from victimization.
Unrestricted academic freedom expresses the loosening of an indispensable social cohesion and the decay of standards, and permits or promotes the erosion of the social order. Academic discourse should recognize, and if necessary be required to recognize, the limits implicit in the consensus concerning goals, values and procedures that is integral to the society in question.
Unrestricted free speech in relation to political matters—most obviously when extended to those who reject the basic premises of the given society and utilize freedom of speech as a device for attacking the society's foundations—expresses, like unrestricted academic freedom, the loosening of social cohesion and the decay of standards, and condones the erosion of the social order.
Whether or not there is any truth that is both objective and capable of being known to be so, no society can preserve constitutional government or even prevent dissolution unless in practice it holds certain truths to be, if not literally self-evident, then at any rate unalterable for it, and not subject to the changing will of the popular majority or of any other human sovereign.
A number of principles have been appealed to as the legitimate basis of government, and most of these have been associated in the course of time with bad, indifferent and moderately good government. Government resting on unqualified universal franchise—especially where the electorate includes sizable proportions of uneducated or propertyless persons, or cohesive sub- groups—tends to degenerate into semi-anarchy or into forms of despotism (Caesarism, Bonapartism) that manipulate the democratic formula for anti-democratic ends.
In their existential reality, human beings differ so widely that their natural and prudent political ordering is into units more limited and varied than a world state. A world state having no roots in human memory, feeling and custom, would inevitably be abstract and arbitrary, thus despotic, in the foreseeable future, if it could conceivably be brought into being. Though modern conditions make desirable more international cooperation than in the past, we should be cautious in relation to internationalizing institutions, especially when these usurp functions heretofore performed by more parochial bodies.
It is neither possible nor desirable to eliminate all inequalities among human beings. Although it is charitable and prudent to take reasonable measures to temper the extremes of inequality, the obsessive attempt to eliminate inequalities by social reforms and sanctions provokes bitterness and disorder, and can at most only substitute new inequalities for the old.
It is impossible and undesirable to eliminate hierarchies and distinctions among human beings. A large number of distinctions and groupings, rational and non-rational, contributes to the variety and richness of civilization, and should be welcomed, except where some gross and remediable cruelty or inequity is involved.
Whether or not sub-groups of humanity defined by physical or physiological attributes differ congenitally and innately in civilizing potential, they do differ in their actual civilizing ability at the present time and are likely to continue so to differ for as long in the future as is of practical concern.
Among the goals of political and social life, well-being is sub- ordinate to survival; and all secular goals are in the last analysis sub- ordinate to the ultimate moral or religious goal of the citizens composing the community.
Disputes among groups, classes and nations can and should be settled by free discussion, negotiation and compromise when—but only when—the disputes range within some sort of common framework of shared ideas and interests. When the disputes arise out of a clash of basic interests and an opposition of root ideas, as is from time to time inevitably the case, then they cannot be settled by negotiation and compromise but must be resolved by power, coercion and, sometimes, war.
Except in marginal and extreme cases, the duty of government is not to assure citizens food, shelter, clothing and education, and security against the hazards of unemployment, illness and old age, but to maintain conditions within which citizens, severally and in association, are free to make their own arrangements as they see fit. (pp. 125-131)
Whether the ideas contained in this list are, as Burnham contends, free of ideological commitments, we will leave it to our readers to judge.
Having come full-circle, we conclude this critique as we began it, with some questions, then some quotations. Just what, indeed, would it take to change one’s perspective, not just on the war in Ukraine, but fundamentally? Will argument suffice? Or, following Enlightenment precedent (p. 143), must it be argument plus mockery to induce shame? Or must there be violence? War? Revolution? 5-MeO-DMT (p. 223)?
Perhaps we’ll never know. In the meantime,
“Make trial how the life of a good man would succeed with you, of one who is pleased with the lot appointed him by providence, and satisfied with the justice of his own actions, and the benevolence of his dispositions.
You have seen the other state, try also this. Don’t perplex yourself. Has any man sinned or offended? The hurt is to himself. Hath any thing succeeded with you honourably? Whatever befalls you was ordained for you, by the providence of the whole, and spun out to you by the destinies. To sum up all, life is short. You must make the best use of the present time, by a true estimation of things, and by justice: and retain sobriety in all relaxations.” Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, Bk. IV, 25-26.
And we’ll leave it to Burke to underscore this point,
He that wrestles with us strengthens our nerves and sharpens our skill. Our antagonist is our helper. This amicable conflict with difficulty obliges us to an intimate acquaintance with our object and compels us to consider it in all its relations. It will not suffer us to be superficial. It is the want of nerves of understanding for such a task, it is the degenerate fondness for tricking shortcuts and little fallacious facilities that has in so many parts of the world created governments with arbitrary powers. They have created the late arbitrary monarchy of France. They have created the arbitrary republic of Paris. With them defects in wisdom are to be supplied by the plenitude of force. They get nothing by it. Commencing their labors on a principle of sloth, they have the common fortune of slothful men. The difficulties, which they rather had eluded than escaped, meet them again in their course; they multiply and thicken on them; they are involved, through a labyrinth of confused detail, in an industry without limit and without direction; and, in conclusion, the whole of their work becomes feeble, vicious, and insecure.
It is this inability to wrestle with difficulty which has obliged the arbitrary Assembly of France to commence their schemes of reform with abolition and total destruction. But is it in destroying and pulling down that skill is displayed? Your mob can do this as well at least as your assemblies. The shallowest understanding, the rudest hand is more than equal to that task. Rage and frenzy will pull down more in half an hour than prudence, deliberation, and foresight can build up in a hundred years. The errors and defects of old establishments are visible and palpable. It calls for little ability to point them out; and where absolute power is given, it requires but a word wholly to abolish the vice and the establishment together. The same lazy but restless disposition which loves sloth and hates quiet directs the politicians when they come to work for supplying the place of what they have destroyed. To make everything the reverse of what they have seen is quite as easy as to destroy. No difficulties occur in what has never been tried. Criticism is almost baffled in discovering the defects of what has not existed; and eager enthusiasm and cheating hope have all the wide field of imagination in which they may expatiate with little or no opposition.
At once to preserve and to reform is quite another thing. When the useful parts of an old establishment are kept, and what is superadded is to be fitted to what is retained, a vigorous mind, steady, persevering attention, various powers of comparison and combination, and the resources of an understanding fruitful in expedients are to be exercised; they are to be exercised in a continued conflict with the combined force of opposite vices, with the obstinacy that rejects all improvement and the levity that is fatigued and disgusted with everything of which it is in possession. But you may object—“A process of this kind is slow. It is not fit for an assembly which glories in performing in a few months the work of ages. Such a mode of reforming, possibly, might take up many years.” Without question it might; and it ought. It is one of the excellences of a method in which time is amongst the assistants, that its operation is slow and in some cases almost imperceptible. If circumspection and caution are a part of wisdom when we work only upon inanimate matter, surely they become a part of duty, too, when the subject of our demolition and construction is not brick and timber but sentient beings, by the sudden alteration of whose state, condition, and habits multitudes may be rendered miserable. But it seems as if it were the prevalent opinion in Paris that an unfeeling heart and an undoubting confidence are the sole qualifications for a perfect legislator. Far different are my ideas of that high office. The true lawgiver ought to have a heart full of sensibility. He ought to love and respect his kind, and to fear himself. It maybe allowed to his temperament to catch his ultimate object with an intuitive glance, but his movements toward it ought to be deliberate. Political arrangement, as it is a work for social ends, is to be only wrought by social means. There mind must conspire with mind. Time is required to produce that union of minds which alone can produce all the good we aim at. Our patience will achieve more than our force. If I might venture to appeal to what is so much out of fashion in Paris, I mean to experience, I should tell you that in my course I have known and, according to my measure, have co-operated with great men; and I have never yet seen any plan which has not been mended by the observation of those who were much inferior in understanding to the person who took the lead in the business. By a slow but well-sustained progress the effect of each step is watched; the good or ill success of the first gives light to us in the second; and so, from light to light, we are conducted with safety through the whole series. We see that the parts of the system do not clash. The evils latent in the most promising contrivances are provided for as they arise. One advantage is as little as possible sacrificed to another. We compensate, we reconcile, we balance. We are enabled to unite into a consistent whole the various anomalies and contending principles that are found in the minds and affairs of men. From hence arises, not an excellence in simplicity, but one far superior, an excellence in composition. Where the great interests of mankind are concerned through a long succession of generations, that succession ought to be admitted into some share in the councils which are so deeply to affect them. If justice requires this, the work itself requires the aid of more minds than one age can furnish. It is from this view of things that the best legislators have been often satisfied with the establishment of some sure, solid, and ruling principle in government—a power like that which some of the philosophers have called a plastic nature; and having fixed the principle, they have left it afterwards to its own operation.
To proceed in this manner, that is, to proceed with a presiding principle and a prolific energy is with me the criterion of profound wisdom. What your politicians think the marks of a bold, hardy genius are only proofs of a deplorable want of ability. By their violent haste and their defiance of the process of nature, they are delivered over blindly to every projector and adventurer, to every alchemist and empiric. They despair of turning to account anything that is common. Diet is nothing in their system of remedy. The worst of it is that this their despair of curing common distempers by regular methods arises not only from defect of comprehension but, I fear, from some malignity of disposition. Your legislators seem to have taken their opinions of all professions, ranks, and offices from the declamations and buffooneries of satirists; who would themselves be astonished if they were held to the letter of their own descriptions. By listening only to these, your leaders regard all things only on the side of their vices and faults, and view those vices and faults under every color of exaggeration. It is undoubtedly true, though it may seem paradoxical; but in general, those who are habitually employed in finding and displaying faults are unqualified for the work of reformation, because their minds are not only unfurnished with patterns of the fair and good, but by habit they come to take no delight in the contemplation of those things. By hating vices too much, they come to love men too little. It is, therefore, not wonderful that they should be indisposed and unable to serve them. From hence arises the complexional disposition of some of your guides to pull everything in pieces. At this malicious game they display the whole of their quadrimanous activity. As to the rest, the paradoxes of eloquent writers, brought forth purely as a sport of fancy to try their talents, to rouse attention and excite surprise, are taken up by these gentlemen, not in the spirit of the original authors, as means of cultivating their taste and improving their style. These paradoxes become with them serious grounds of action upon which they proceed in regulating the most important concerns of the state. Cicero ludicrously describes Cato as endeavoring to act, in the commonwealth, upon the school paradoxes which exercised the wits of the junior students in the Stoic philosophy. If this was true of Cato, these gentlemen copy after him in the manner of some persons who lived about his time—pede nudo Catonem. Mr. Hume told me that he had from Rousseau himself the secret of his principles of composition. That acute though eccentric observer had perceived that to strike and interest the public the marvelous must be produced; that the marvelous of the heathen mythology had long since lost its effect; that the giants, magicians, fairies, and heroes of romance which succeeded had exhausted the portion of credulity which belonged to their age; that now nothing was left to the writer but that species of the marvelous which might still be produced, and with as great an effect as ever, though in another way; that is, the marvelous in life, in manners, in characters, and in extraordinary situations, giving rise to new and unlooked-for strokes in politics and morals. I believe that were Rousseau alive and in one of his lucid intervals, he would be shocked at the practical frenzy of his scholars, who in their paradoxes are servile imitators, and even in their incredulity discover an implicit faith.” (pp. 138-141)